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Vertical epistemic communities in multilevel governance   
Céline Mavrot and Fritz Sager 
Literature defines epistemic communities as knowledge-based networks whose purpose is to influence 
policy. While previous studies often focused on the horizontal functioning of epistemic communities, 
we expand the debate by integrating the vertical dimension as an additional governing structure. We 
argue that vertical epistemic communities take advantage of multiple-scale systems to generate 
coherent strategies which enable them to influence policymaking. Through the case of Swiss smoking 
prevention policy, we study how vertical epistemic communities in federalist systems can lead to policy 
harmonisation between member states. They do so by shifting the decision-making process away from 
the political towards expert arenas. 
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Introduction 
There is a well-established body of comparative literature on epistemic communities, which basically 
suggests that experts and professional actors form international knowledge-based networks by 
building trust and common understandings, and that individual members of these communities try to 
influence policy in their domestic governments (Haas, 1992). While we know a lot about their 
horizontal functioning – that is, among members when they are equals – (Marier, 2008), as well as 
about how they form and mobilise at the national (King, 2005; Thomas, 1997) and supranational levels 
(Zito, 2001; Dunlop, 2010), we know less about their vertical functioning – that is, when there is a 
hierarchical relationship between members, for instance when they are distributed over different 
levels of government – and the ways in which they mobilise and perform in multilevel policymaking 
systems in which power is fragmented. Indeed, multilevel governance systems imply complex 
dynamics between ‘a diverse set of state…and non-state actors…, multiple sites and levels…, and a 
range of formal and informal decision-making processes’ (Alcantara and Nelles, 2014, 184). In this 
paper, we argue that epistemic communities have certain advantages in such an institutional context 
because the experts’ common backgrounds, aims and policy understandings help them generate 
coherent multilevel strategies that can influence policy in many arenas. In this multilevel context, we 
identify a vertical epistemic community as a specific form of epistemic communities. Correspondingly, 
we combine the notion of epistemic communities, which strongly emphasises their horizontal 
functioning (how their members interact with one another and which kind of strategies they adopt to 
pursue their policy objectives), with research on multilevel governance. The latter strongly emphasises 
the steering aspects of vertical relationships, that is, how superordinate actors aim to influence the 
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action of subordinate actors, be it by means of a formal hierarchical structure (hierarchy of laws, formal 
division of competences, distribution of financial resources) or by exercising informal power. 
Furthermore, rather than studying how decision-makers are likely to learn from epistemic 
communities (Haas, 2004), we investigate how vertical epistemic communities are able, in part, to 
actually bypass decision-makers. 
We build our argument upon the case of the recent Swiss tobacco control policy. In this domain, the 
previously prevailing subnational heterogeneity is gradually being replaced by a secondary 
harmonisation phenomenon, where the policies of the subnational politico-administrative units, the 
cantons, tend to converge. The concept of secondary harmonisation addresses the same phenomenon 
as policy diffusion and policy transfer studies. Both address the puzzle that political units adopt similar 
solutions for policy problems without being coerced to do so. While policy diffusion studies aim at 
explaining this phenomenon (Gilardi, 2010), the policy transfer literature is interested in the way a 
policy is adapted. Correspondingly, policy transfer is defined as ‘the process by which knowledge about 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) 
is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another 
political system’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, 5). Policy transfer research has paid much attention to 
learning effects and policy convergence in multilevel governance structures, whether in federalist 
(Benz, 2012) or in supranational systems (Howell, 2009). Finally, Ingold and Monaghan (2016) highlight 
the crucial role of ‘evidence translators’ in the corresponding process by which evidence from home 
or overseas contexts is incorporated into policy. 
Secondary harmonisation is a term developed in Switzerland to capture the specific federalist 
challenge that the central state depends on the member states to deploy coherence in the 
implementation of federal policies but lacks coercive power to make them do so. Kissling-Näf and 
Knoepfel (1992, 65) established the term ‘secondary harmonisation’ to describe the conundrum that 
the cantons in fact do converge. We argue that due to the vertical component of multilevel governance 
structures, secondary harmonisation phenomena cannot be fully explained by policy transfer alone. 
Therefore we propose an explanation by scrutinising the activity of what we call a ‘vertical epistemic 
community’. The term ‘vertical epistemic community’ has been used by Oliver Richmond (2008, 164–
9) in a different context, to depict ‘vertical multilateralism’ between state and non-state actors in 
peacebuilding at the international level. In our case, this vertical network, or community, mainly 
comprises the national and subnational senior civil servants who are responsible for designing and 
implementing tobacco control policies in Switzerland. It also includes recognised public health and 
scientific experts, as well as leading non-state national tobacco control organisations, who advise and 
work with the civil servants. They are connected through their professional background, values and 
knowledge (primarily in the field of public health management), and share common policy goals based 
on their expertise concerning this topic (strengthening regulation and establishing evidence-based 
policies); they collaborate in a coordinated manner in order to push their agenda. As we will 
demonstrate, by establishing an alliance in the form of an epistemic community, administrative experts 
install themselves within a network in which they become mutually interdependent, whereas, in 
exchange, they are better able to cope with uncertainty (Thomas, 1997) and gain independence from 
the local and national political arenas. They gain autonomy by joining forces and sharing their specific 
resources, in particular financial means on the side of national civil servants, and local capacity to act 
on the side of subnational civil servants. 
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As we will observe, this transaction – allegiance to an expert network in exchange for partial autonomy 
from the political decision-makers – can allow the logic of epistemic communities to prevail over the 
political one in policymaking. This relates to a crucial aspect of the policy research that deals with the 
question of the circumstances under which the policymaking process is likely to rely upon expertise 
(Cross, 2013; Dunlop, 2009). Moreover, we underline how epistemic communities can take advantage 
of multilevel systems: they pursue their objectives by means of a vertical steering that benefits from 
the multiple entry points such systems provide. In particular, they take advantage of the horizontal 
and vertical cooperation that is required in systems such as federalist ones. By ‘vertical cooperation’ 
we mean the monitoring of the member states by the federal government in a given policy sector. This 
can be done using a broad array of instruments that range from incentives to compulsory 
requirements. ‘Horizontal cooperation’ designates the mostly voluntary efforts of member states to 
coordinate with, and inform one another because they all face similar policy challenges. In a nutshell, 
horizontal cooperation means coordination between different jurisdictions at the same federal level 
and vertical cooperation means coordination among entities belonging to different levels. By retracing 
this policy process, we underline the existence of this specific category of vertical epistemic 
community, and specify its modus operandi in a multilevel context. More specifically, we investigate 
how vertical epistemic communities are able to use vertical cooperation tools and procedures to 
successfully shift the policymaking process from the political to the administrative arenas. Thus, by 
highlighting the functioning of vertical expert networks in multilevel governance, we also contribute 
to the refinement of the literature on epistemic communities. 
In the first part of the paper, we propose a theoretical reflexion on the notion of epistemic 
communities within the context of multilevel governance and underline how both approaches can be 
advantageously linked. We then introduce the concept of secondary harmonisation as our main 
phenomenon to be explained, that is, our dependent variable. Next, we expose our theory-driven 
expectations regarding the ability of vertical epistemic communities to take advantage of multiple-
scale systems through multilevel coordination, and their ability to shift the location of the decision-
making system. We then turn to the case study, before discussing the results of our analysis and 
addressing paths for further research. 
Vertical epistemic communities in multilevel governance: taking advantage of the fragmented 
decision-making system 
In a nutshell, multilevel governance ‘has become the code word for a number of interrelated 
developments in public administration’ which especially reflect the fact that nowadays ‘policy making 
requires that many actors outside of central government…work together’, and that new ‘division of 
labor between governmental levels’ have to be found (Piattoni, 2014, 668). Hooghe and Marks (2003) 
distinguish between Type I governance, dispersing authority to existing durable jurisdictions, and Type 
II governance with task-specific flexible jurisdictions. The two types ‘embody contrasting conceptions 
of community’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2003, 240): while Type I is based on encompassing communities, 
the ‘constituencies of Type II jurisdictions are individuals who share some geographical or functional 
space and who have a common need for collective decision making’. In the following, we argue that 
the two forms can intersect: actors that evolve in a Type I governance structure (for example, senior 
civil servants) may actively try to subvert the frontier and integrate actors pertaining to Type II 
governance (for example, experts) in a given policy sector. This allows them to overcome specific 
institutional or political deadlocks and to push their agenda. We therefore propose that the concept 
of multilevel governance should be complemented with an additional governing structure that we label 
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‘vertical epistemic community’. In this, general-purpose Type I jurisdictions with non-intersecting 
memberships are governed through a task-specific community, thereby overcoming the vertical 
coordination dilemma and leading to secondary harmonisation of cantonal policies. 
The concept of epistemic communities (ECs) is particularly well suited to analyse the activities of expert 
networks. It applies to any ‘network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-
area’; the members of an epistemic community have four common principles: 
 
(1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a valuebased rationale 
for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs… (3) shared notions 
of validity – that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating 
knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise – that is, 
a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional 
competence is directed. (Haas, 1992, 3) 
 
They usually enjoy important social recognition for their competencies, based on their distinctive 
professional knowledge. They can be both national and international (Haas, 1992, 16–17), and are 
often partly located within governmental structures (Cross, 2013, 153). The concept of epistemic 
community is intended to inform policy changes, particularly through the learning processes that occur 
during policymaking (Radaelli, 1999, 768). It was set up for the analysis of public action in the context 
of growing complexity, specialisation and issue uncertainty (Haas, 1992, 7). It enables us to examine 
how, by infiltrating governing institutions, temporarily consensual and socially recognised knowledge 
may contribute to policy definition (Haas, 1992, 23–9). 
The epistemic community has to be distinguished from other types of professional communities on 
the one hand, and from broader policy or advocacy networks on the other hand. It must first be noted 
that not all members of a profession form an epistemic community per se. Certain specific groups 
within a profession can, however, form an EC on the basis of their shared expertise, on the condition 
that they pursue collective policy goals as a result of these qualities. Their professional validity test (or 
truth test) guides them in defining their policy goals (Haas, 1992). Such ‘strong epistemic communities 
and associated professional communities’, generally elaborate rather rigid policy frames that are 
‘difficult to alter’ (Peters, 2013, 580). The professionalism that ties EC members together, their 
common professional socialisation and culture, differentiate them from any other militant group 
gathered for a common policy goal, or from more encompassing advocacy coalitions (Cross, 2013, 155–
9). While both epistemic communities and advocacy coalitions consist in networks whose members 
share knowledge and aim at policy change (Hogan and O’Rourke, 2015), advocacy coalitions 
fundamentally rest on a set of normative/ ontological values, and ‘rely upon their belief system to 
filter, interpret, understand, and distort reality, as well as to shape their networks and, hence, the 
structure of coalitions’ (Cairney and Weible, 2015, 92–3). In contrast, the selection principle of 
epistemic communities is shared professional expertise. Epistemic communities also differ from 
broader policy coalitions in that they do not commit themselves to policy issues other than in their 
areas of expertise (Haas, 1992, 17–20). Furthermore, even though it can be partly composed of civil 
servants, an EC is distinct from a simple bureaucratic group since it promotes broader policy 
enterprises than the traditional administrative mission (Haas, 1992, 19). 
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The epistemic community framework has not been widely used in the study of smoking prevention 
policies. This is surprising, since these politics are often led by expertise-based coalitions that fully 
correspond with the definition of epistemic communities. Next, the fragmented character of 
policymaking in this area, especially in a federalist political system, has been highlighted: ‘[the] analysis 
indicates that multiple venues through federalism are important for tobacco control policy’ (Studlar, 
2009, 407). The multiple entry points provided by a multilevel system for developing innovative – or 
even contentious – public health measures has been demonstrated: ‘the division of authority over 
second-hand smoke regulations, even in centralized polities, may make this policy instrument [that is, 
lesson-drawing processes] particularly susceptible to such bottom-up policy diffusion’ (Bossman and 
Studlar, 2009, 376). Hence, tobacco control policies are an especially apposite venue in which to study 
epistemic communities and multilevel governance. Such diffusion dynamics have already been 
observed in other prevention areas, such as drug policies. Within this context, the need to closely 
analyse the long-term birth and structuring of the involved coalitions has been assessed (Kübler, 2001, 
623). 
Another question regards the circumstances under which policy makers are likely to rely upon experts, 
that is: when are epistemic communities successful? The factors affecting the probability of running 
an evidence-based policymaking process are manifold, and can relate to the epistemic coalition’s 
characteristics, the national and the political context, the configuration of actors, and the specific 
history of the policy sector concerned. Cross (2013, 144) provides an overview of the factors favourable 
for the success of expert networks in policymaking. For our purposes, we will focus on an argument 
that approximates that of Peterson and Bomberg (1997), namely, that epistemic communities are 
more likely to succeed when ‘they deal with the subsystem, technocratic phase of decision-making, 
rather than shaping broader political beliefs’.  
For these authors, the emphasis lies on the phase of the policy-cycle. Indeed, in our case study, the 
success of the epistemic community in question is due to the location of the decision-making process 
in more technocratic spheres (that is, administrative, as opposed to political, arenas). Moreover, in our 
case the epistemic community itself provoked a shift in the decision-making, thereby substantially 
strengthening its ability to intervene. Therefore, our focus will lie not only on the capability of such 
networks to intervene in a given decision-making system, but also to shape that system. The decision-
making system will not be considered as a fixed framework monopolised by a predetermined set of 
actors (Bergeron et al, 1998, 218–19). In this context, the question is no longer how communities 
manage to influence decision-makers (especially elected officials), but rather how they manage to 
partially replace them by altering the nature of the decision-making process. 
 
Secondary harmonisation as policy standardisation through vertical and horizontal cooperation 
The issues of expert-based policymaking can be usefully linked with the research on multilevel 
governance, for example, in a federalist context. In this light, it can be understood how, by using the 
opportunities offered by the functioning of a federal state, vertical epistemic communities manage to 
promote policy measures and standards that meet their expert criterion, while simultaneously leading 
to a certain secondary harmonisation among member states. Here, the notion of vertical epistemic 
community helps explain the secondary harmonisation process at work. Switzerland is a showcase 
example for the study of multilevel governance.  As a highly federalist and decentralised state, 
Switzerland experiences a policymaking process located mainly at the subnational level. The cantons 
are endowed with extensive policy formulation and implementation competences leading to a certain 
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cantonal heterogeneity (Vatter, 2004). However, in spite of this important cantonal leeway, a 
phenomenon of secondary harmonisation has been observed in many policy fields: cantonal policies 
still tend to converge through diverse mechanisms (Kissling-Näf and Knoepfel, 1992, 65). 
Compensation logic is at work, and the cantons counterbalance their implementation differences and 
deficits via coordinating strategies, whereby such strategies have the potential to become real steering 
instruments for cantonal public action (Sager, 2003, 311). Secondary harmonisation is the result of 
these coordination activities. This secondary harmonisation facilitates better coherence at the national 
level. Cantonal policies can converge via different vertical or horizontal mechanisms, such as national 
incentives, inter-cantonal cooperation, and political or citizen initiatives (Balthasar, 2003). 
Harmonisation can also be described as ‘an increasingly prevalent feature of public administration 
designed to address regulatory overlap, duplication and inconsistency’, especially in federalist systems. 
The harmonisation processes may relate to the outputs, outcomes, principles or procedures, and aim 
at simple compatibility, consistency, or even uniformity (Windholz, 2012, 323 ss). In the case of tobacco 
control policies in Switzerland, horizontal inter-cantonal policy coordination had already existed, for 
example in voluntary negotiation arenas such as meetings of cantonal health ministers (Trein, 2016). 
Our focus here is on the national vertical coordination carried out through a new form of coordination: 
the emerging cantonal smoking prevention programmes. 
Policy programmes – as a specific form of coordinated public action – are typical for the cantonal 
intervention in Swiss public health. They constitute an intermediate level of public action within the 
federalist state. As a ‘distinctive part of a policy portfolio…policy programs thus occupy a central 
position translating high-level goals and instrument logics and aspirations into operationalizable 
measures’ (Howlett et al, 2014, 2). In Switzerland, preventive policies in general have historically been 
conducted at the cantonal level, through a rather fragmented logic. Although cooperative strategies 
can be observed, certain obstacles often prevent full harmonisation, namely, the lack of cantonal 
resources to participate in horizontal inter-cantonal cooperation and insufficient national incentives to 
stimulate cantonal participation in vertical cooperation (Sager, 2003). Interestingly, it has been 
observed that in the case of programme adoption, the decision is usually more administrative than 
political (Sager and Rielle, 2013, 2). Avoidance of the political spheres can occur through the following 
processes: 
While the fragmented territorial order necessitates voluntary coordination processes, it 
also fosters the danger of power-driven processes due to the high veto power of every 
participating municipality trying to maximize its advantage. This effect can be offset by 
the combination of a centralized organizational structure preventing parallel information 
flows with the separation of the technical sphere from the political sphere, supporting 
evidence-based rather than interest-oriented negotiations. This institutional constellation 
is described as ‘hierarchically embedded epistemic communities’. (Sager, 2005, 247) 
These mechanisms of harmonisation and avoidance lie at the heart of our analysis of the activities of 
vertical epistemic community through coordination procedures and instruments in a federalist 
context.  
Following these theoretical insights, we have two theory-driven expectations concerning the 
secondary harmonisation prompted by the actors of the vertical epistemic community observed in our 
case study. In the following, secondary harmonisation is our dependent variable, and we define it as 
regards the epistemic community’s achievements – namely, its ability to successfully promote 
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evidence-based and strengthened tobacco control policies. First, the secondary harmonisation at work 
in this field is achieved under the pressure of a powerful vertical epistemic community composed of 
national and subnational experts (as defined by Haas, 1992) which takes advantage of the need for 
federal and inter-cantonal cooperation (Sager, 2003) to impose its view. Second, this vertical epistemic 
community pursues its goals by infusing the policymaking process with expert knowledge (Haas, 1992, 
23); in particular, we can expect that the epistemic community is likely to be successful by managing 
to intervene in the technocratic phase of the decision-making process (Peterson and Bomberg, 1997), 
or even by shifting the heart of the cantonal policymaking process away from the political spheres and 
towards the administrative ones. 
The Swiss smoking prevention governance as a vertical epistemic community 
Since 2011, a new epistemic community – mainly comprising national and cantonal senior civil servant 
in charge of designing and implementing tobacco control policies – has been emerging in this field. As 
smoking prevention policies in Switzerland are mainly a cantonal task, and politically controversial, this 
case is particularly salient to the examination of how a vertical expert network can work on their 
centralised coordination as well as technicalisation of policies. We will focus on three aspects. First, we 
will see that an emerging alliance between national and cantonal experts is leading to a new public 
health logic in this field. The usual cantonal ‘learning by doing’ method is being replaced by an 
evidence-based approach under the leadership of a vertical network of experts. Second, whereas the 
cantons previously limited themselves to a rather loose horizontal inter-cantonal coordination, we are 
now witnessing a truly secondary harmonisation process as a result of the vertical epistemic 
community’s coordination efforts around cantonal programmes as a new form of policy organisation. 
Third, we will analyse this epistemic community’s mode of action and see how it has succeeded in 
shifting the centre of gravity in policymaking from the political to the administrative level. 
The case study is based on an ongoing comparative research on smoking prevention policies in 
fourteen Swiss member states. The study started in 2012 and is based on an exhaustive document 
analysis (parliamentary debates, reports, administrative guidelines, policy papers, yearly self-
evaluation documents from implementation actors), semi-structured interviews with experts of the 
vertical epistemic community and field observations (national, cantonal and inter-cantonal expert 
meetings). To this day, six cantons have been studied and 62 interviews conducted. The case-study is 
structured as follows: we first provide an overview of the (in)formal division of competence that has 
so far prevailed in this policy area. Second, we relate the history of the vertical epistemic community, 
and locate its positioning within the multilevel system. Third, we analyse the evidence-based logic 
promoted by the vertical epistemic community in the context of the profile of its members. Fourth, we 
describe the procedure through which the new policy logic is diffused, before illustrating how the 
vertical epistemic community succeeds in partially moving the decision-making process away from 
politics. 
Smoking prevention policy in Switzerland: the high degree of cantonal autonomy 
In the Swiss multilevel system, the implementation of smoking prevention policies is a cantonal task, 
while the federal level is entrusted with the general regulatory requirements (tobacco products, 
taxation, national campaigns and global coordination). The cantons are responsible for designing and 
implementing the preventative, counselling, as well as therapeutic measures. Moreover, they have the 
authority, within the national legislative framework, to further regulate advertising, sale and passive 
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smoking. While the Confederation enacts the general legislative framework, the cantons are in charge 
of effective law enforcement. Until recently, due to the Confederation’s weakness regarding policy 
implementation, coordination was mainly horizontal and derived from voluntary inter-cantonal 
efforts. Nevertheless, considerable change has occurred since the creation of a new leading national 
actor in 2004. Loose and partial inter-cantonal coordination is gradually being replaced by a more 
encompassing vertical coordinating approach under the leadership of federal experts, making it a 
particularly interesting case for the study of expert policymaking and policy change in a multilevel 
context. 
The creation of a vertical epistemic community: local and national actors 
The turning point in the policymaking logic occurred with the creation of a new actor at the national 
level in 2004: the Tobacco Control Fund, which rapidly built a genuine epistemic community, vertical 
in nature. The Fund was created after the increase in tobacco tax in 2003, decided by the national 
parliament. The Fund’s mission is to manage this new and considerable revenue. It decides on the 
allocation of the money, distributing it among the relevant actors (cantonal administrations, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)). This decision-making power makes it an important actor within 
policymaking. A panel of experts designs the broad lines of the Fund’s strategic orientation, which is 
approved by the Federal government every couple of years. The Fund finances prevention, cessation 
and information projects. The creation of a national tobacco control network is also one of its missions 
(RS 641.316, 2004, art.2). Thanks to its considerable steering power, the Fund was rapidly able to 
achieve this goal (Sager et al, 2015).  
The actors in charge of designing and implementing smoking prevention policy at the cantonal level 
(mostly cantonal civil servants but sometimes also para-administrative organisations to which the task 
was delegated) were previously largely dependent on local authorities, which decided the budgets 
available for tobacco control. With the money derived from the new taxation rules, these cantonal 
actors can now request money from the Fund for important sums via a cantonal smoking prevention 
programme. While participation is not mandatory, this new policy structure enables the Fund to 
encourage cantonal actors to join the network through the creation of cantonal programmes. Through 
the policy definition process, both types of actors – national and cantonal – determine which path to 
take, gradually creating a common expert culture. Thus, cantonal programmes represent a concrete 
operationalisation of higher level goals and aspirations (Howlett et al, 2014, 2). The network-building 
activity of the Fund is intensive. It rapidly set up a channel of administrative, associative and academic 
actors throughout the country, who are integrated within the Fund’s activities in various ways: 
counselling, partnerships, monitoring, coordination and joint research. Including these actors in its 
channelling activities allows the Fund to act in a flexible and efficient way. This corresponds to an 
integration of Type II governance actors in order to subvert the frontiers of the governance structure 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Finally, the Fund’s network grants access to local and national smoking 
prevention activities. 
The Fund and its network form an epistemic community, since they share the same vision of 
prevention, based on their common professional background; they view their claims as legitimate 
because they are scientifically founded and empirically grounded, and their expertise is socially 
recognised. Furthermore, they assume that their knowledge grants them the right to formulate policy 
goals and procedures (Haas, 1992). Through their collaboration, a common epistemic culture and 
shared objectives are progressively being built. Together, these national and cantonal experts are 
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constructing common norms, language and mode of actions through their convergence around the 
new smoking prevention programmes.  
This epistemic community grouped around the Tobacco Control Fund is comprised principally of actors 
who are for the most part trained in public health management and rely on the corresponding scientific 
literature, have a high-level education, leading positions, and generally less field experience than the 
grassroots prevention workers. In addition to the Fund’s experts, the epistemic community comprises 
other national civil servants from the Federal Office for Public Health (FOPH). The community also 
comprises a committee of external experts (permanent consultative commission) whose mission is to 
advise the Fund (RS 641.316, 2004, art.7). Including university professors, senior civil servants, 
cantonal public health actors or members of leading smoking prevention NGOs, the members of this 
commission are a source of inspiration and legitimacy for the Fund, and encourage the diffusion of 
jointlydeveloped ideas. Finally, the cantonal heads of the smoking prevention programmes (civil 
servants or para-administrative actors) are also part of the vertical epistemic community. Thus, this 
vertical epistemic community has access to both national and cantonal spheres of policymaking. 
National experts provide the network with financial resources, thematic expertise and experience in 
lobbying, while subnational experts provide local knowledge and entry points, as they have the legal 
competence to act at the cantonal level. Together, they can be seen as ‘evidence translators’ (Ingold 
and Monaghan, 2016), using the network to disseminate an evidence-based logic for smoking 
prevention policymaking. 
The vertical epistemic community: the dissemination of the evidence-based logic 
The core of the new public health logic promoted by this vertical epistemic community is an evidence-
based, cumulative and evaluative logic. The idea is no longer to run fragmentary cantonal activities. 
Local activities have to be integrated into a national repertoire of best practices and scientifically 
evaluated in order to accumulate evidence. The aim is to draw lessons from the different cantonal 
experiences as to which approaches work best, and why. Naturally, these changes sometimes cause 
problems for the grassroots prevention workers. They have an intimate knowledge of the local 
circumstances, have invested time in the design of projects, and have longstanding experience. Some 
of them believe that the resources committed to the building of the epistemic community ought to be 
invested in the prevention itself instead.  
In contrast, the members of the vertical epistemic community have strong incentives to alter the 
prevailing logic. They occupy more all-encompassing positions, which subject them to different types 
of constraints than the field workers. Their task consists in allocating and coordinating rather than 
implementing. The Fund plays an important role in the selection of projects and has to decide the 
optimal allocation of national resources. It is accountable to the national political authority as to the 
use of public funds. Hence, the Fund needs a system within which its choices can be secured and 
legitimised. As to the other national experts (FOPH, scientific experts), they share with the Fund a deep 
belief in the evidence-based approaches from a public health point of view. In terms of backgrounds, 
their profiles are closer to those of public health managers than prevention practitioners. The heads 
of the cantonal programmes, meanwhile, can substantially increase their preventative budget by 
participating in the process, play a greater role in orchestrating cantonal activities and diversify their 
action. Since their local activities were limited to the means granted by the cantonal authorities prior 
to the creation of the Fund, this financial leeway allows them a considerable degree of autonomy vis-
a-vis cantonal politics. Thus, by participating in the process, the cantons surrender a certain thematic 
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and procedural autonomy to the benefit of the vertical epistemic community, in exchange for a more 
advantageous autonomy from local politics. This corresponds to the mechanism underlined by Thomas 
(1997), where members of an epistemic community exchange uncertainty against interdependence to 
the network. 
Best practices: a depoliticized action repertoire 
The new policy logic is diffused by means of the cantonal smoking prevention programmes, initiated 
by the Tobacco Control Fund. Subject to certain requirements, the cantons can apply to the Fund for 
the financing of a cantonal programme. The programme as a specific form of coordinated policy 
delivery is a powerful tool, which can strongly influence policy. For example, the cantons have to plan 
rigorous evaluations of the programmes, which is permeated with an impact logic that aims at 
measuring the programmes’ effects and at drawing lessons for the future. The aim is to accumulate 
evidence about the conditions of success or failure for different projects of each programme. Each 
project has to be assigned precise output and outcome objectives. This typification allows for the 
construction of a centralised body of knowledge. 
The Tobacco Control Fund also provides a predefined set of projects which can be implemented in the 
cantons. These projects can be selected by the heads of the cantonal programme, who then receive 
technical support to implement and evaluate them. Finally, the Fund specifically suggests that the 
cantons strengthen the applicable law. Through the provision of such a catalogue of projects, the 
epistemic community is able to intervene in the very content of cantonal programmes. Cantons are 
required to design their programme on the basis of a certain framework. The new design of the 
programmes in line with this evidence-based logic has initiated an unprecedented dynamic within the 
policymaking process. The phenomenon stimulates profound learning processes between cantonal 
and federal experts brought together in this vertical epistemic community. This logic infiltrates the 
cantonal level – the level with responsibility for policy implementation and broad policymaking 
powers. The vertically coordinated programmes become an instrument of policy convergence between 
cantons, thus leading to secondary harmonisation according to the definition of Kissling-Näf and 
Knoepfel (1992). The epistemic community succeeds in spreading its public health approach through 
a soft but powerful formative form of governance. Using this process of generating evidence-based 
policies, the vertical epistemic community attempts not only to strengthen tobacco control policy 
itself, but also to consolidate its own position as undisputed expert actor in the policymaking process. 
In doing so, the vertical epistemic community has managed to instigate important changes in the 
process of policy formulation and implementation, away from the political sphere. 
Avoiding political controversy: the relocation of the decision-making process 
The creation of the Fund occurred at a crucial juncture. A few years prior to its creation, the national 
experts were extremely dissatisfied with national tobacco control policy, which had reached an 
impasse. One political event was particularly revealing of the obstacles at the national level. In 2003, 
the national parliament refused a general ban on tobacco advertising that would have been based on 
the European example. Up until that point, along with the protection against second-hand smoke, the 
general advertisement ban had been one of the experts’ main challenges. Nevertheless, the federal 
assembly approved an increase in tobacco tax and the creation of the Fund in the very same year. The 
experts who had pushed for the creation of the Fund drew conclusions from the obstacles to legislative 
improvements: the political interests in this domain are highly contradictory, as the decisions made by 
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the national parliament showed (Spinatsch and Hofer, 2004, 1). Taking note of the potential political 
obstacles when putting such divisive subjects to the vote, yet willing to strengthen the cause, these 
national experts decided to pursue a new approach. The Fund, as a flexible organisational tool, 
provides the ideal opportunity to work toward this aim. 
Following this parliamentary defeat, the national network focused on a more depoliticised and discrete 
modus operandi. Instead of advocating new proposals at the national level, it pursues its new approach 
primarily by allying with cantonal actors in charge of local policies and enacting guidelines for the 
cantonal programmes. This new focus is the reason for the creation of the vertical epistemic 
community. The Fund began to address the cantons directly and, through targeted support, to 
encourage them to strengthen and to better enforce their legislation. It gave the cantons the means 
to better exert their power, thus providing ‘learning opportunities’ that facilitate policy change 
(Radaelli, 1999, 769). The coordination encouraged by the Fund through the empowerment of each 
canton fosters local policymaking and secondary harmonisation. Despite the tensions, the activities of 
the cantonal and the national experts forming the vertical epistemic community are mutually 
supportive. 
The difficulty of achieving any improvement via the national political arena was later confirmed: a 
federal law on smoking restrictions in public places was passed in 2010 but remained rather loose, and 
the Swiss population rejected a popular initiative that aimed at reinforcing protection against second-
hand smoke exposure in 2012 – an initiative that was not actually launched by the vertical epistemic 
community. Following these substantial defeats at the national political level, the Fund (FPT, 2012, 3, 
authors’ translation) stated in a position paper that: 
The smoking prevention programmes developed by the cantons allow them to make full 
use of the competences entrusted to them by law, in a concrete and targeted 
manner…the cantons play a central role in smoking prevention in Switzerland. They must 
continue to exploit their broad legislative competencies to reduce tobacco consumption 
and protect health, in particular against passive smoking, by taking measures concerning 
advertising and sponsorship, or access to tobacco products (for example by prohibiting 
their sale to youth). 
This sudden insistence on the cantonal competence appears as a means of overcoming the national 
political blockages. According to this logic, the Fund pays special attention to law enforcement in 
regard to the financing of cantonal programmes. Part of the Fund’s support aims specifically at the 
proper application of existing cantonal laws regarding advertising, smoking bans, and sales to minors. 
By doing so, it deals with more technocratic phases of the policymaking (Peterson and Bomberg, 1997). 
In practice, the cantons often do not have the resources to fully monitor the implementation of the 
existing law through police or labour inspectorate controls, or test purchases to prevent sales to 
minors. Unable to change the national legislation, and taking advantage of the federalist system 
(Studlar, 2009), the experts focused on the cantonal level. Whereas the lack of local action in the area 
of law enforcement was previously a result of cantonal political choices concerning resource allocation, 
the Fund has transformed this into a technical issue by providing the necessary means to enhance 
implementation. Moreover, the Fund also specifically encourages cantons to strengthen their 
regulations, by financing projects that aim to prepare cantonal revisions of these regulations (for 
example, advertising restrictions). The cantonal experts seize these opportunities to advance the cause 
at the local level. 
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With the existence of the Fund, the cantonal experts have more resources for law enforcement 
and reforms. Previously, they concentrated their efforts mainly on behavioural prevention. Now, 
with these significant increases of their budgets, they are able to (and motivated to) pay more 
attention to these aspects. Moreover, unless it is explicitly challenged in parliament, law 
enforcement in the cantons remains limited to the executive and administrative levels. The 
entire issue can remain fairly low-profile in contrast to the situation if a comprehensive debate 
on allocating choices were to be played out in parliaments. Similarly, through these 
programmes, legal reforms are now planned and prepared by experts before the topic emerges 
in the cantonal parliaments. Such reform proposals can eventually be proposed by the 
governments as technical revisions requested by professionals, thus limiting the risk of political 
appropriation. This proves more difficult when the reforms are directly proposed by a 
parliamentary group. The strategy of the vertical epistemic community is thus to avoid the 
political sphere whenever possible, and to confine the policymaking process to the 
administrative and expert levels. The processes that occur within the epistemic community are 
less visible, and, thus, less open to attack by external opponents. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
cantonal politicians refuse the resources offered by the Fund, even if these may be synonymous 
with a relative transfer of authority to the smoking prevention experts. Consequently, the 
process launched in the wake of the epistemic community is remodelling the decision-making 
process, shifting it from the political to the administrative arenas. 
Conclusion and perspectives 
The described network of national and subnational stakeholders constitutes what we call a vertical 
epistemic community. It has successfully gained legitimacy by including a large network of tobacco 
control experts among its members in order to overcome existing political obstacles. The three 
elements highlighted in the literature on epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) – a set of professional 
actors willing to translate their expert-based ideas into policy objectives – were indeed present in our 
case. Moreover, they were divided among different levels of government. Both types of experts fuelled 
the vertical epistemic community with specific resources: financial means and knowledge for the 
national experts, and field experience, local legitimacy and entry points for the subnational experts. By 
paying allegiance to an interdependent vertical expert network, these actors were able both to 
overcome the political deadlock at the national level on the one hand, and to gain autonomy from local 
allocative political decisions on the other hand. These experts transformed smoking prevention policies 
via the cantonal smoking prevention programmes as a specific form of coordinated policy delivery. 
Ultimately, through the vertical coordination initiated around these new programmes, a new form of 
secondary harmonisation has emerged in this policy area. This harmonisation is carried out through an 
innovative process, notably the diffusion of evidence-based best practices, and fosters cantonal 
legislative progress. In turn, by progressively imposing new policy standards, this secondary 
harmonisation tends to further strengthen the vertical epistemic community in its ability to shift 
policymaking from politics to administration. 
It thus appears that a strong vertical epistemic community could be a decisive factor in the secondary 
harmonisation in a federalist system. Through its financial, scientific, and technical capabilities, the 
Fund was able to enrol subnational actors. Furthermore, the vertical epistemic community has partly 
shifted the decision-making process to the administrative spheres, thus technicising it. Crucially, in our 
case, the epistemic community itself actively worked to alter the substance of the decision-making 
process by provoking this shift. This point is important as the epistemic community literature tends to 
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focus on the ability of the coalitions to convince decision-makers. Epistemic communities are seen as 
‘the transmission belts by which new knowledge is developed and transmitted to decision-makers’ 
(Haas, 2004, 587). The latter seem to be viewed as somewhat a fixed factor. In our case, the epistemic 
community displays more than convincing power: by bypassing the political arena, this vertical 
epistemic community demonstrated its ability to partially codetermine the decision-makers. The 
literature has strongly highlighted how challenging it can be to mobilise knowledge in a policymaking 
process when political debate is simultaneously underway (Haas, 2004, 588). In our case, the epistemic 
community strives precisely to build a solid centralised corpus of knowledge and practice upstream of 
any political debate. 
Some general conclusions can be drawn from our investigation. First, we argue that the observed 
governance structure of building expertise and depoliticising policy issues can be abstracted from the 
case study. Vertical epistemic communities can be regarded as a specific form of multilevel governance 
by expert networks in which scientific knowledge and common understanding not only supports 
horizontal coordination among different constituencies, but rather, is actively included in a vertical 
network, whereby concrete policy goals are pursued in a top–down manner. Second, secondary 
harmonisation between subnational units can be driven by vertical epistemic communities that include 
actors from different levels of government and bring them together around common objectives and 
governing structures. Third, vertical epistemic communities take particular advantage of multilevel 
systems, such as federalist states, which offer various entry points. The existing need for horizontal 
and vertical coordination in such systems provides these networks with numerous opportunities to 
promote their views. By including the key players at different levels (national and subnational civil 
servants for instance), experts in the vertical epistemic communities are able to diffuse their solution 
in many policy arenas and to play with the different levels, as Studlar (2009) has shown, in order to 
avoid deadlock. In this context, the ability of the experts to ‘supply concrete policy solutions to 
governments’ (Hawkins and Holden, 2014, 67) is decisive in the policymaking process. As Benz et al 
(2016) note with respect to the European Union, governance research that pays closer attention to the 
complex administrative interactions in multilevel systems has great potential for achieving a genuine 
understanding of the power of such ‘multilevel administration’. Fourth, next to the preconditions for 
the success of epistemic communities influencing policymaking listed by Cross (2013), their ability to 
remove the decision-making process from the political arena towards the administrative arena can be 
added.  
To conclude, bringing together the epistemic communities perspective (Haas, 1992) – usually rather 
focused on horizontal processes – and the multilevel governance perspective, which often emphasises 
vertical steering, provides important insights. The specificities of a particular sort of epistemic 
communities – which we refer to as vertical – was highlighted. We showed that vertical epistemic 
communities are particularly suitable to mobilise experts on sectoral policymaking in a multilevel 
context. This is of special relevance in federalist systems such as Switzerland or the United States, and 
can also shed light on the dynamics of certain policy processes in supranational systems such as the 
European Union. The vertical epistemic community concept may be further tested in other policy and 
implementation networks, and future research may corroborate similar governance logics in other 
sectors within multilevel settings, be it in a national or in an international context. 
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